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Abstract 
Around the world, clients procure construction contracts aiming at project completion within predefined cost, time 
and quality constraints. In parallel, it is critical in the public sector to achieve the contract award as objectively as 
possible. In most cases, the public clients’ award is based on the lower price only; in the contracts, penalties are 
foreseen for time deadlines violation and quality control bad results. In the European Union legislation, the most 
economically advantageous tender is also considered as an award criterion, encompassing in fact many sub-criteria. 
The pros and cons of both approaches have extensively been discussed in the literature. Therefore, the choice of a 
procurement method that will combine the merits of both approaches to the wider possible extent is of utmost 
importance. In this paper, a new award method based on the most economically advantageous tender is proposed. The 
sub-criteria considered are construction cost, completion time and warranty offered by each bidder. Their objective 
evaluation is carried out by implementing utility theory. An illustrative worked example is provided. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of IPMA 
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1. Introduction 
All over the world, completing each tendered project within predefined time, cost and quality 
constraints is a primary aim for both the clients and their project managers. Although all the above three 
factors play significant roles in the success of a construction project, their importance is ranked according 
to the specific requirements of each client and project. Private clients may often rank time as the most 
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important of the three criteria; public clients placed historically more importance on quality and secondly 
on cost. But since nowadays, European Union (EU) and national infrastructure programmes set strict 
dates for projects completion, at the client’s risk of losing funding if deadlines are not met, the time factor 
has become extremely important for the public sector, too. 
For public works, quality can in no case be compromised. That is why most selection procedures 
employed by public clients during project tender ensure that all eligible tenderers are capable of achieving 
the minimum quality standards defined in the tendering document specifications. This is then guaranteed 
after contract award through strict quality control procedures and is not negotiable. 
Further to successful construction contract completion, for the public sector clients and their staff in 
particular, it is of even greater importance to award each contract as objectively as possible. For this 
reason, in most cases the public clients’ award is based on the lowest price only; in the contracts, 
penalties are foreseen for time deadlines violation and quality control bad results.  
In the EU legislation, the most economically advantageous tender is also considered as an award 
criterion, encompassing in fact many sub-criteria. The pros and cons of both approaches have extensively 
been discussed in the literature. Therefore, the adoption of a procurement method that will combine the 
merits of both approaches to the wider possible extent is of utmost importance.  
The scope of this paper is to propose a new award method that is in line with EU legislation and 
incorporates the above rationale. The method applies the criterion of the most economically advantageous 
tender; the sub-criteria considered are construction cost, completion time and durability / warranty offered 
by each bidder. Their objective evaluation is carried out by implementing utility theory.  
2.  Contract tendering under EU legislation 
The general framework for the tender procedures for public works contracts is defined in the EU 
legislation; it aims at ensuring fair competition for the award of contracts. The legislation is obligatory to 
all Member States and therefore must be respected by all clients (contracting authorities). Any deviation 
from it renders the competition invalid. The relevant Directive defines the following allowable 
procedures: 
• ‘Open procedures’ are those procedures whereby all interested contractors may submit tenders. 
• ‘Restricted procedures’ are those procedures whereby only those contractors invited by the contracting 
authority after selection may submit tenders.  
• ‘Negotiated procedures’ are those procedures whereby contracting authorities consult contractors of 
their choice and negotiate the terms of the contract with one or more of them.  
• ‘Competitive Dialogue’ is a procedure for the case of particularly complex contracts where the 
contracting authorities consider that the use of open or restricted procedures will not achieve 
successful award. The contracting authority conducts a dialogue with the tenderers that have been pre-
selected in accordance with the relevant provisions of EU legislation with the aim of developing one or 
more suitable alternatives capable of meeting its requirements. 
In the case of a tender without pre-selection phase, clients that place long-term confidence on standing 
lists (registers) of eligible contractors, instead of re-evaluating each tenderer’s status nearer to contract 
award, may face situations where the chosen contractor is not capable of completing the project, either for 
technical or financial reasons. 
On the other hand, pre-selection procedures can become complicated, in particular when many criteria 
are to be evaluated, and their results are often based on subjective analyses. Furthermore, the time 
required to complete the procedure may be excessive, rendering it unproductive. The required time for a 
prequalification phase can be substantially reduced with the use of strict non-subjective participation 
criteria (financial and technical) that can be quantified and easily evaluated. 
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In order to ensure fair competition and transparency of procedures, the Directive distinguishes clearly 
between selection criteria and award criteria. The selection criteria refer to the tenderers’ financial and 
technical capability to complete the project. The Directive is also clear in not allowing the use of selection 
criteria during the award phase and limiting them to the first phase evaluation, prior to opening the 
technical and financial bids. In addition, the Directive specifically determines the sole situations by which 
a tenderer may be excluded, thus guaranteeing fair competition. 
The award criteria refer to the specific project and result in the determination of the best bid from the 
selected capable tenderers. There are two alternative award criteria: either the lowest price or the most 
economically advantageous offer, except for the Competitive Dialogue procedure where only the most 
economically advantageous offer criterion is permitted. In the case of the lowest price criterion, when 
abnormally low bids are excluded by the client, the EU legislation foresees the opportunity for the bidders 
to justify their offers and obligates the client to communicate to the Commission the reasons for their 
rejection. The most economically advantageous offer can be evaluated based on various sub-criteria: 
price, completion period, cost effectiveness, quality, profitability, technical merit etc. 
Furthermore, public clients must be extremely careful when employing subjective criteria in the award 
procedures as they are subject to criticism by competitors who may appeal to the European Courts, thus 
causing delays, which may lead to funding problems and loss. Subjective criteria are qualitative criteria 
that cannot be easily quantified and scored. Non-subjective criteria are expressed in numerical values 
directly by the bidder and require no evaluation by the client’s selection committee. 
3. Literature Survey 
Research that has been carried out on contract tender procedures focuses primarily on the definition 
and evaluation of pre-selection methods and secondly on the development of award ones. 
Regarding the award criterion used, the common experience is that the great majority of construction 
contracts are awarded based on the lowest price offered. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the final 
choice of a contractor based solely on the lowest price does not guarantee the delivery of the required 
project outcome in terms of cost, time and quality, as it seems that most clients ignore the fact that the 
same organization performs differently in a dissimilar environment (Palaneeswaran & Kumaraswamy 
2001). 
Furthermore, awarding contracts based only on the lowest bid runs the risk of poor performance by 
this contractor during the project life, as unrealistic offers can lead to the financial inability to carry out 
the required work. This results in management and supervision problems on behalf of the client and 
claims and disputes on behalf of the contractor and corresponding completion delays.  
To cope with the problem, average bid methods have been proposed. Although they may reduce the 
delays expected due to claims, they may result in a less cost-effective choice for the client. The temporary 
success of such a method applied in Greece (Greek Law 2576/1998) can be attributed to its automatic 
function, which required no judgment decisions on the part of the award committee, as justification of the 
excluded extremely low bids was not requested. But this contravened the EU legislation, which requires 
justification of all the bids lower than the preferred ‘average’ bid; this is an exercise difficult to handle 
and time consuming. Therefore, the method was withdrawn in short time.  
Undoubtedly, the lowest price criterion constitutes an objective and transparent approach; however, it 
involves significant risks since it fails to guarantee the quality of the contractor’s performance. As a 
result, the lowest bid price may not correspond to the most economic choice in the long run, because it 
motivates contractors to provide minimally acceptable construction products (Kashiwagi & Byfield 
2002).  
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In an attempt to alleviate the risks emerging from awarding contracts exclusively based on the cost 
criterion, many researchers have proposed broader bid evaluation with both qualitative and quantitative 
criteria and alternative multi-attribute selection methods, e.g. weights and scores methods, informal and 
intuitive methods using group consensus, multi-objective utility methods, fuzzy sets approaches, 
analytical hierarchy processes. In particular regarding the use of utility theory, among others: 
Holt et al. (1994) proposed a three-stage evaluation procedure, based on multi attribute analysis and 
utility theory, involving criteria related to the contractor’s organization, financial status, management 
resources, past experience and past performance.  
Hatush and Skitmore (1997) argued that except from the bid amount, efficient evaluation strategies 
involve 5 more groups of criteria, pertaining to financial soundness, technical ability, management 
capability, and the health and safety performance of contractors. According to the utility theory - based on 
the evaluation model that they proposed (1998), each contractor’s score derives from the utility curves 
defined by the client for each criterion.  
Palaneeswaran et al. (2003) introduced a four-stage framework for best-value based contractor 
selection, noting that the perspectives on best value could differ according to particular viewpoints and 
thus the contractor assessment criteria should be appropriately selected to match the specific client 
objectives and the project’s requirements.  
It should be said that these methods reduce the risk of a less capable bidder getting the job, but in most 
cases they violate the EU legislation by mixing selection and award criteria or by being non-transparent, 
e.g. the definition of utility curves after the opening of bids.  
Moreover, most of the proposed approaches incorporate the assumption that factors related to 
organizational expertise, such as past history of performance and relevant experience, can guarantee the 
project’s quality. Nevertheless, the integration of guarantee provisions to the contracts, widely used in the 
US during the last decade, is found to have the potential to increase more efficiently the project’s quality 
and the contractor’s performance. Since the contractor runs the risk of repairing or replacing work that 
fails to meet the prescribed standards, he has direct incentives to produce high quality projects from the 
beginning. The survey of Bayraktar et al. (2004) on the relevant state-of-practice in 13 States confirms 
the above, as the majority of the involved Departments of Transportation report improvement in the 
project’s quality while the majority of the contractors reported that warranty provisions encourage them 
to this direction. 
Warranty has also been introduced in US as a bid evaluation criterion leading to the system termed as 
“Warranty Performance Bidding” or (A-Q) bidding. In this system, a contractor’s bid is adjusted by 
predetermined and specified amounts to reflect each additional year beyond a minimum number of years 
of warranty. More specifically, each bidder has to submit two proposals i.e. for cost in dollars (A) and for 
warranty duration (d) in years. Q component is the value in dollars deriving from the proposed warranty 
duration exceeding the minimum required period multiplied by the clients’ estimated “credit per year”. 
The lowest (A-Q) value indicates the bid for award. Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2000) consider 
this system among the best approaches to bid evaluation. 
Padhi and Mohapatra (2010) developed a binary goal programming model which evaluates among 
others the quoted time for completion of the project, the quoted warranty period and the past performance 
of the contractor.  
Mateus et al. (2010) focus on the development of criteria scoring rules; they note that the weights 
attributed to criteria such as time or warranty have to effectively represent the trade-offs that occur. 
Conclusively, from the literature survey no ‘best overall’ contract award method has emerged; the 
most appropriate method depends on the specific conditions at the time and place of tender of each 
particular project, as well as on the characteristics of each client. 
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4. Proposed award method 
In this paper it is proposed to award construction contracts on the basis of the most economically 
advantageous tender by employing the evaluation of three non-subjective quantitative criteria which 
provide undisputed competition results. The proposal expands previous work by Lambropoulos (2007) 
regarding the employment of two non-subjective criteria, i.e. time and cost. 
The developed method of evaluating construction cost, time and warranty bids is based on utility 
theory, which provides a uniform scale to compare the satisfaction provided by various criteria. Utility 
functions quantify the preferences of the decision taker / client by assigning a numerical index to varying 
levels of satisfaction of each criterion. The method is in line with EU legislation and implements 
predefined utility curves (specified in the tender documents by the client, known prior to bids submittal 
and clearly independent of them), which will allow the determination of optimal bids providing maximum 
utility to the client; it takes into consideration: 
• The utility of the financial bid for the client (i.e. the financial discount on the tender budget).  
• The utility of the time offer for project completion (i.e. the offered time discount in relation to the 
construction deadline specified by the client).  
• The utility of the post-construction warranty offer (i.e. the offered time extension in relation to the 
minimum warranty specified by the client). 
The total utility for the client of a  bid, with a financial discount c %, a time discount t % and a 
durability warranty extension d %, results from the following formula: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + +c t dU KU XU U  
 
where U( ) is the total utility of the  bid, U( c) the utility of the ’s financial discount c, U( t) the 
utility of the ’s time discount t, U( d) the utility of the ’s warranty extension and K, X and  are 
predefined weighting factors, + + =1. 
In cases of a project split into m sub-projects, the total utility provided is defined as the weighted 
aggregate of the cost and time utility values for each sub-project: 
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where Bi is the client’s estimated construction budget for section i, U( ci) the client’s utility of 
tenderer’s  percentage financial discount for section i, U( ti) the client’s utility of tenderer’s  percentage 
time discount for section i and U( di) the client’s utility of tenderer’s  percentage warranty extension for 
section i. 
 
1 2= + + + mB B B ... B  
 
The proposed utility curves for cost and time discounts and warranty extension are of the form shown 
in Figure 1. For simplification reasons, the utility curve can be defined as a polygonal line, in order for 
the results to be easily converted into a tabular format (see Figure 2). The gradient of each straight line 
corresponds to the marginal utility derived by the client at varying intervals of discount / extension. 
The cost utility curve can be split into three or more distinct sections. For example in Figure 2, in the 
low discount range, it can be assumed that the bidder’s profit level is high and therefore the client’s 
marginal utility is low. In the mid-discount range, the bidder is assumed to have a reduced profit margin 
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and therefore higher utility is achieved by the client. In the highest discount range, the bidder is at a loss 
and this can only lead to high risks regarding completion and as a result no additional utility can be 
obtained by the client.  
Fig. 1. Time, cost and duration utility curves 
 
Fig. 2. Theoretical time, cost and warranty polygonal lines 
The time utility curve can also be split into at least three distinct sections. In Figure 2, it can be 
observed that in the low discount range little utility is provided to the client as the bidder’s offer in this 
range is just a result of his resource planning techniques, probably without any additional construction 
cost. In the mid-discount range, the bidder must obviously make an effort to provide more resources at 
additional cost, in order to be able to complete the project in a shorter period of time and this provides a 
much greater marginal utility to the client. The last part of the time utility curve corresponds to non-
achievable time reductions and there is little or no additional utility to be obtained by the client. 
The warranty utility curve can also be split into many distinct sections. In Figure 2, it can be observed 
that in the low extension range, little utility is provided to the client as the bidder’s offer in this range is 
just a result of his improved construction techniques and quality control tests and procedures, probably 
with a small additional cost. In the mid-extension range, the bidder must obviously make an effort to 
repair at additional cost and this provides a greater marginal utility to the client. In the highest extension 
range, the bidder will face substantial repair and replacement costs and this provides a much greater 
129 Sergios Lambropoulos /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  74 ( 2013 )  123 – 133 
marginal utility to the client. Obviously, the client will define the longest accepted warranty depending on 
the nature of the works, e.g. accepted asphalt layer life.  
5. Implementation issues 
According to the proposed method all bidders are required to submit simultaneously a financial offer 
(expressed as a percentage discount on the client’s estimated construction budget), a time offer (expressed 
as a percentage discount on the completion time set by the client) and a warranty offer (expressed as a 
percentage time extension in relation to the minimum post-construction warranty specified by the client). 
They will also submit: 
• A total quality plan. 
• A broad qualitative and quantitative analysis of the main activities involved.  
• Time schedules including the duration and sequence of the main activities and works on the basis of 
the proposed equipment, as well as guaranteed machinery productivity performances.  
These will not be evaluated but they should be in line with the bidders’ offers. Failure to adhere during 
construction to the aforementioned submissions (e.g. if guaranteed productivity performances are not 
achieved or quality controls are not conducted as promised) shall lead to a forfeiture of the letters of 
guarantee and, finally, to the contractor’s forfeiture (provided that the contractor does not immediately 
proceed to the provision of additional resources and corrective actions). Negative time and financial 
discounts shall not be permitted. 
In order for the above-mentioned method to be successfully implemented: 
• Prior to the award procedure it must be ensured that the tenderers selected meet strict financial and 
technical criteria (economic capacity, credit standing, technical capability, experience, equipment, 
laboratories, certifications etc.) in order to prove that they have the ability to complete the work. This 
requirement may lead to the implementation of an appropriate pre-selection procedure.  
• The client should be well organized and take the appropriate action in order to reduce to the minimum 
the obstacles to project completion. Therefore, the maturity and constructability of designs and their 
compatibility with contractual documents and estimated construction budget must be ensured. The 
client must also secure immediate access to land for the construction of the project in terms of 
expropriations, public utility networks and archaeological excavations and obtain all necessary 
permits, approvals and consent of the authorities involved etc. for all the necessary activities and 
operations relating to the project, including the determination of borrow pits, disposal areas etc.  
• After the award of the contract, the client should respond immediately to any technical, contractual and 
other problems arising during the project execution and should assure the financial capacity for timely 
settlement of payments to the contractor.  
• The winning contractor will be required to submit additional letters of guarantee of significant value 
for his time offer, apart from those required for good performance. These will be forfeited if the 
offered completion deadlines are not observed or the guaranteed machinery productivity is not 
achieved for reasons due to the contractor’s liability. The value of these letters of guarantee is 
proposed to amount to a percentage of the estimated construction budget, equal to the offered time 
discount multiplied by the time weighting factor. In the case of time discounts offered for individual 
sections with a stage deadline, the same will apply on the estimated construction budget for each 
section and the sum of guarantees of the individual sections will constitute the total additional 
guarantee for the whole project. The monitoring method, regarding the observance of the time 
schedules offered and of the guaranteed productivity performances, as well as the method of forfeiture 
of the guarantees should be defined in the tender documents.  
• The winning contractor will also be required to submit additional letters of guarantee of significant 
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value for his warranty offer, apart from those required for good performance and time offer. These will 
be forfeited if the offered warranty is not respected. The value of these letters of guarantee is proposed 
to amount to a percentage of the estimated construction budget, equal to the offered warranty 
percentage extension times the warranty weighting factor times a reduction factor set by the client (e.g. 
0.15). The monitoring method, regarding the warranty extension offered, as well as the method of 
forfeiture of the guarantees should be defined in the tender documents.  
An illustrative worked example of the implementation of the proposed method is included in Appendix 
A in order to provide the reader with a better understanding. 
6. Conclusions 
The proposed award method employs the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender 
according to EU legislation and incorporates the use of client utility curves to evaluate construction cost, 
time and warranty offered. The utility curves are defined by the client prior to tender and are independent 
of the bids submitted.  
The method is objective, fast and compatible with EU legislation. It increases the quality of works and 
the durability of the project. It reduces the construction time through competition procedures and not by 
bonus or penalty. It achieves quick removal from the project of the contractor who fails to meet his 
offered time schedule or warranty. It contributes to the improvement of the technical and organizational 
structures of contractors given that they compete not only on cost but also on time and on durability, i.e. 
leading to broader organizational efficiency. It also contributes to the improvement of the technical and 
organizational structure of the client since he has to respond faster to construction issues.  
Conclusively, the proposed method will result in faster construction and more durable projects; it is 
suitable in particular for environments governed by fierce competition, criticism on transparency issues, 
frequent litigations etc. and to clients tendering projects subjected to time stringent financing 
programmes. 
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Appendix A. Application example 
The following example refers to the ‘discount’ system for pricing as used for the procurement of 
public works in Greece. In this system, the client issues drawings, specifications and a schedule of 
quantities and prices resulting in a total estimated construction budget. Tenderers offer a discount against 
this budget. 
The project under consideration concerns the construction of the anti-skid layer at a 91 Km motorway 
section. The estimated construction budget is 10 M€ and the maximum allowable time duration is 20 
months. 
The required data known to the tenderers are shown in Table 1. The client’s utility curves for the 
specific project can be derived from the points provided. Each point’s abscissa corresponds to the 
discount or extension percentage offered while the ordinate represents the relevant utility value. The 
warranty extension percentage has been reduced to the 100- point scale. 
Table 2 is for internal client document preparation and tender evaluation. It presents in a simplified 
format how the estimates of the maximum allowable deadline were defined by the client on the basis of 
the minimum equipment required, the average production rate (performance/time unit) and the total 
quantities of the works. 
The tenderers submit along with their financial bids the completion deadline, based on their available 
equipment and estimated production rates. Table 3 shows an example of a time schedule that may be 
provided by a tenderer to achieve the offered deadline. 
Table 4 presents an example of financial discount c, time discount t and warranty extension d 
offered by the  tenderer. 
Table 5 shows the corresponding utility of the financial discount U( c), time discount U( t) and 
warranty extension U( d) for the project. The total utility U( ) of the example offer is shown in the last 
column.  
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Successful bidder is the one with the highest total utility offer. 
Table 6 presents the calculation of the required additional performance bonds for the offered time 
discount and warranty extension.  
 
Table 1. Example project details 
Project: Anti-skid layer construction works for Motorway Section  
Budget: 10M €; financial discount weighting factor K=45% 
Cost utility curve points (0,0), (15,660), (23,860), (30,930), (100,1000) 
Maximum construction time: 20 months ; time discount weighting factor X= 25% 
Time utility curve points (0,0), (20,80), (60,920), (100, 1000) 
Minimum warranty period: 30 months; maximum accepted warranty extension:300%; warranty extension factor =30% 
Warranty utility curve points (0,0), (16.67,30), (33.33,1000), (50, 220), (66.67, 400), (83.33, 650), (100,1000) 
 
Table 2. Calculation of client’s deadlines 
Minimum 
equipment 
required 
Work produced by 
each unit of the 
required equipment 
in a time unit 
Total 
quantity 
Time required Estimated idle time 
due to adverse 
weather conditions, 
unforeseen 
occurrences, 
installations, 
transportations etc. 
(in months) 
Total time 
required in 
months 
Comments 
Since the antiskid 
layer has to be 
constructed during 
summer period 
(May – 
September), two 
summer periods 
are required. A 
deadline of 20 
months is, 
therefore, selected 
Time 
unit 
(day) 
Work 
produced 
Working days Months 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)=(b)(d)/[(a)(c)] (f)=(e)/22 (g) (h)=(f)+(g) 
1 asphalt 
plant and 1 
finisher 
1 1,000tn or 
12,800m2 
2,000,000 
m2 
156 7 4 11 
 
Table 3. Offered deadlines based on equipment production rates 
Minimum 
equipment 
required 
Work produced by 
each unit of the 
required equipment 
in a time unit 
Total 
quantity 
Time required Estimated idle time 
due to adverse 
weather conditions, 
unforeseen 
occurrences, 
installations, 
transportations etc. 
(in months) 
Total time 
required in 
months 
Comments 
Since the anti-skid 
layer has to be 
constructed during 
summer period 
(May – 
September), one 
summer period is 
required. A 
deadline of 7 
months is, 
therefore, selected 
Time 
unit 
(day) 
Work 
produced 
Working days Months 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)=(b)(d)/[(a)(c)] (f)=(e)/22 (g) (h)=(f)+(g) 
2 asphalt 
plants and 
2 finishers 
1 1,000tn or 
12,800m2 
2,000,000 
m2 
78 4 3 7 
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Table 4. Example offer 
Offer Financial discount 
c (%) 
Construction time 
(months) 
Construction time discount 
t (%) 
Durability warranty 
extension (months) 
Durability warranty 
extension 
d (%) 
1 17.00 7 65.00 80 266.67 
Table 5. Calculation of overall utility for example offer 
Offer 
Financial 
discount  
c (%) 
Financial 
discount 
utility U( c) 
Construction 
time discount  
t (%) 
Construction 
time discount 
utility U( t) 
Durability 
warranty 
extension  
d(%) 
Durability 
warranty 
extension 
utility U( d) 
Overall 
utility of 
the offer 
U( ) 
1 17.00 710.00 65.00 930.00 266.67 766.67 782.00 
The resulting overall utility of the offer is as follows: U( ) = 0.45*710+0.25*930+0.3*766.67=782.00  
 
Table 6. Additional guarantees for the most advantageous financial offer 
Offer Construction time 
discount  
t (%) 
Required 
guarantee for time 
discount € 
Durability 
warranty 
extension  
d (%) 
Required 
guarantee for 
durability 
warranty 
extension € 
Total required 
guarantee € 
1 65.00 1,625,000 266.67 1,200,000 2,825,000 
Estimated 
construction 
budget B=10M € 
Time discount weighting factor X=25% Warranty extension weighting factor =30% and reduction 
factor 0.15 
 
